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Robert Sepúlveda: Post-Alice Pendulum Swing

THE POST-ALICE JURISPRUDENCE PENDULUM AND ITS
EFFECTS ON PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
John Robert Sepúlveda*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the last few years Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
International1 has dominated and changed the landscape for patent
eligibility of business method and software inventions. The Supreme
Court’s unanimous decision in Alice has had the effect of eviscerating
intellectual property rights in the field of software inventions.2 In 2015
alone, district courts invalidated almost 70% of all patents challenged
under Alice and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) technical centers that focus on e-commerce had monthly
rejection rates of well over 85%.3 If left unclarified and uncorrected,
this decision will continue to stifle innovation and deprive people of
the incentive to create new software inventions.

* Attorney at law, Carter, DeLuca & Farrell LLP, Touro Law Center, J.D. 2017. Thanks to
Michael Morales, David Lee, Michael Kraich, and Professor David Aker for conversations or
suggestions that greatly improved this Note, and to all the members of the Touro Law
Review for their meticulous editing. All views and errors expressed in this Note are entirely
my own.
1 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (holding that claims directed to an electronic escrow service were an
abstract idea and that mere implementation of an abstract idea on a computer system was
insufficient to find the claims patent eligible).
2 See, e.g., Years After Alice: Eligibility-Rejections Outflow from a Different Part of the
USPTO, JDSUPRA (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/years-after-aliceeligibility-70833/.
3 See, e.g., Donald Zuhn,
Top Five Stories of 2016, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 8, 2017),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/01/top-five-stories-of-2016.html (noting that “the monthly
35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection rates for USPTO Technical Centers 3620, 3680, and 3690 were over
85% for most of the year”); see also An Update On Section 101 Rejection Rates At The
USPTO, LAW 360 (Oct 21, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/716742/an-update-onsection-101-rejection-rates-at-the-uspto; James Cosgrove, The Most Likely Art Units for Alice
Rejections, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/14/themost-likely-art-units-for-alice-rejections/id=63829/ (“While Alice rejections can be found all
over the USPTO, roughly two-thirds of them are found in T[ech]C[enter] 3600.”).
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This article will primarily discuss how the post-Alice
jurisprudence regarding patent subject matter eligibility for claims
directed to software has swung like a pendulum, from the basic normal
human activity implemented on a generic computer to the more
sophisticated improvements in the field. Section II of this article
discusses patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section III
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice. Section IV analyzes
developments in the law since Alice, primarily in the Federal Circuit.
Finally, Section V explains how the post-Alice jurisprudence
pendulum has swung.
II.

PATENT ELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101

35 U.S.C. § 101 allows inventors and discoverers of “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof” to obtain a patent for their
inventions and discoveries, subject to a few exceptions.4 Section 101
has four basic categories or classes for which patents may be granted:
a process, a machine, an article of manufacture, or a composition of
matter.5 The Supreme Court in Chakrabarty recognized that the
legislative intent was to give patent laws a wide scope.6 For example,
inventions ranging from a method of using living bacteria in
Chakrabarty to software methods have been held patentable under
United States patent law.7
Both the federal courts and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) have developed exceptions to the
statutory eligibility of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.8 The exceptions
to the statutory eligibility of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are: laws of
nature, natural phenomena, naturally occurring substances, and
4

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
Id.
6 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) (stating that statutory subject matter should “include
anything under the sun that is made by man”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308
(1980) (recognizing “[i]n choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by the comprehensive
‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”).
7 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding genetically modified organisms were patentable);
regarding the patentability of software see infra notes 69, 83, and 100.
8 ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 1-7 (7th ed. 2016).
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
601 (2010); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (recognizing that “[t]he laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable”); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 156 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
5
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abstract ideas.9 The rationalization for these statutory exceptions is
that they prevent a monopolization of basic scientific laws, naturally
occurring substances, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, while
granting patents for such subject matter would stunt innovation.10
Several of these exceptions are clear, such as a law of nature like
gravity or a naturally occurring substance like a mineral. 11 On the
contrary, the concept of an abstract idea is considerably less clear. This
has left the Federal Circuit, which is the court that hears all appeals
from district courts regarding patents, groping in the dark, struggling
to define an abstract idea.
The lack of clarity as to what is an abstract idea results from
the Supreme Court’s failure clearly to define the term “abstract idea.”
USPTO and the courts have had to compare claims to previous
scenarios where claims were deemed either patent-eligible or
ineligible.12 The USPTO has identified that the following four
concepts are abstract ideas: “Mathematical Relationships/Formulas,”
“An Idea ‘Of Itself,’” “Fundamental Economic Practices,” and
“Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity.”13
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.,14 the Supreme Court addressed abstract ideas.15 The Court stated
that for a process that recites a law of nature to be patentable, it must
recite additional features that add something significant.16 The Court
held that a claim which simply appends conventional steps, “specified
9

MPEP 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018).
Judith Kim & Scott Schaller, After Alice: The Two Step Rule, LSIPR NEWSL. (Jan. 2015),
http://www.skgf.com/uploads/1378/doc/LSIPR_Jan15_AfterALice.pdf.
11 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309:
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the
wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent
his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law
of gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948)).
12 The USPTO regularly issues subject matter eligibility guidance memos to its staff
covering the various Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in this area of law. See
Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/exami
nation-policy/subject-matter-eligibility (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
13 July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO (July 2015), https://www.uspto.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-update.pdf.
14 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
15 Id.
16 Id.
10
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at a high level of generality” to an already well known method is not
enough to supply an “inventive concept.”17
The Supreme Court in Mayo set forth a two-part test.18 First,
courts must determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea.19 Second, courts
must consider the elements of each claim “both individually and as an
ordered combination” and whether these additional elements
“transform the nature of the claim into a patentable application.”20
Courts must search for an “inventive concept.”21
III.

THE SUPREME COURT’S ALICE FRAMEWORK

The Supreme Court in Alice, addressed patent subject matter
eligibility and abstract ideas.22 In Alice, the patent at issue disclosed a
computerized trading platform for mitigating “settlement risk.”23 The
Court held these claims invalid because they were drawn to the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement, and merely implementing the
claimed method on a generic computer was not enough to transform
them into patent-eligible subject matter.24 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the two-step framework set forth in Mayo for identifying
the abstract idea and then determining whether the claim would
preempt the abstract idea.25
Alice Corporation (“Alice”) owned several patents that “claim
(1) [a] method for exchanging [financial] obligations (the method
claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for
exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a computerreadable medium containing program code for performing the method
of exchanging obligations (the media claims).”26 CLS Bank
International (“CLS Bank”), an operator of an international financial
network that facilitates multicurrency transactions, filed suit against

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 82.
See id. at 87.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id. at 217-21.
Id. at 214 (explaining “[a]ll of the claims are implemented using a computer”).
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Alice.27 CLS argued that the patent claims were invalid, were
unenforceable, or were not infringed.28 Alice counterclaimed, alleging
infringement of its patents.29
The district court, relying on Bilski v. Kappos,30 held all the
claims at issue in Alice as patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C § 101.31
Consequently, the court held that the claims at issue were directed to
the judicial exception of an abstract idea.32 The Federal Circuit, en
banc, affirmed.33
The Supreme Court in Alice elaborated on Mayo’s framework
for the determination of patent eligibility and created a two-part test as
a search for an inventive concept.34 The first step is to determine
whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.35 The
second step is to determine whether the claims’ elements contain an
inventive concept and transform the claims into a patent-eligible
application.36
Under the first step of the analysis, the Court determined
whether the claims at issue were directed to a patent-ineligible
concept.37 In other words, is the claim at issue a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea?38 However, the Supreme Court
cautioned that the lower courts should “tread carefully in construing
this exclusionary principle lest it swallow up all of patent law,”
because when taken to its logical conclusion, all concepts “embody,
use, reflect, rest upon, or apply” the aforementioned patent-ineligible
concepts.39

27

Id.; About Us, CLS, https://www.cls-group.com/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Apr. 8, 2019).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 561 U.S. 593 (2010). For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 40-45 and
accompanying text.
31 Alice, 573 U.S. at 214.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 214-15.
34 Id. at 217.
35 Id. (explaining that the following categories are patent-ineligible concepts: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas”).
36
Id. at 221 (holding that the “abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure
‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 217.
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Analogizing the claims at issue in Alice to those in Bilski, the
Court found that, like the claims in Bilski, the claims at issue in Alice
were directed to an abstract idea.40 In Bilski, the claims were directed
to the abstract idea of hedging against risk.41 Hedging against risk is a
“fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.”42 The claims
in Alice are directed to the idea of intermediate settlement, which is
“the use of a third party to mitigate . . . risk.”43 As in Bilski, Alice’s
use of a clearing house or a third party to mitigate risk “is a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system,” and
therefore is an abstract idea.44 This step in and of itself was not enough
to render a claim patent-ineligible; the Court needed to examine
“[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?”45
Under the second step, the Court determined whether the
claims’ elements contained an inventive concept and transformed the
claims into a patent-eligible application.46 The Supreme Court held
that the implementation of the idea must be something beyond the
“routine,” “conventional,” or “generic.”47 This step is the search for
an “inventive concept.”48 The “inventive concept” must be enough to
transform the “abstract idea into a patent-eligible” one.49
The Court found the patent at issue in Mayo to be instructive.50
In Mayo, the claims at issue were directed towards a method for
measuring metabolites in order to calibrate the dosages of drugs that
were being administered.51 The Court in Mayo found that methods for
measuring metabolites were already “well known in the art.”52 The
Court held that the claimed method was merely an “instruction to
doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients.”53
The claims at issue in Mayo were found to be insufficient to supply the
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 219.
Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217 (alteration in original).
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222.
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“inventive concept” because the claims were merely applying
“conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality.”54
The Supreme Court held that like the claims at issue in Mayo,
the claims at issue in Alice, “add nothing of substance to the underlying
abstract idea,” and are therefore not patent-eligible.55 The Court began
by examining whether the claims in Alice are directed to little more
than the abstract idea of intermediated settlement as implemented on a
generic computer by examining the claimed elements separately and
as an ordered combination.56
First, the Court looked at the claim elements separately. The
claimed elements in Alice are merely “token references to performing
the purported invention on a generic computer.”57 The computer in the
claimed elements performs functions that are “well-understood,
routine, conventional activit[ies]” that are “previously known to the
industry.”58 The Court held that the function performed by the
computer was merely a conventional function performed by a generic
computer.59 The Court affirmed that an abstract idea does not become
non-abstract merely by limiting its field of use, in this case by using a
generic computer to perform generic tasks.60
Next, the Court considered the claimed elements as an ordered
combination.61 When viewed as a whole, the method claims did not
effect an improvement on “the functioning of the computer itself.”62
The claims were merely directed to the abstract idea of intermediated
settlement performed on an unspecified generic computer.63 The Court
held that this was not enough of an “inventive concept” to transform
this abstract idea into a patent-eligible one.64
Therefore, the claims at issue in Alice were found to be a
patent-ineligible abstract idea because they failed both prongs of the
two-step analysis. The claims did no more than recite an abstract idea,
54

Id.
Id. at 227.
56 Id.
57 Dennis Crouch, DDR Holdings – Federal Circuit Forges a Sensible Path on Software
Patents, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 14, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/12/holdingssensible-software.html.
58 Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (alteration in original).
59
Id.
60 Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010)).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 225-26.
64 Id. at 226.
55
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then merely added the instruction to “apply it” on an unspecified
generic computer.65
IV.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES POST-ALICE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
issued several decisions on patent subject matter eligibility under § 101
since Alice was decided.66 These decisions have covered various
subject matter, from budgeting on a computer, e-commerce, and using
advertising as a form of currency, to a self-referential database.67 The
following Federal Circuit decisions did not change the Alice
framework, but have provided some clarification on identifying
abstract ideas.68
In one of the more important cases decided by the Federal
Circuit, the claims at issue in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com,
L.P.,69 were directed to a method for generating a composite web page
that combines selected visual elements from a “host” web site and a
third-party merchant.70 The Federal Circuit affirmed the patent
eligibility of these claims because they were not directed to an abstract
idea.71
Relying on the framework set forth in Alice, the court analyzed
the claims in DDR’s patent.72 First, the court determined whether the
claims at issue were directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.73 The
65

Id.
Robert W. Bahr, Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection and Evaluating the
Applicant’s Response to the Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection, USPTO (May 4, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf; Robert W.
Bahr, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions, USPTO (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/McRo-Bascom-Memo.pdf. The USPTO
has recently issued a new guidance, the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, that seems to help swing the pendulum more to the advantage of software inventors
by limiting the groups of abstract ideas to mathematical concepts, mental processes, or certain
methods of organizing human activity without a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf.
67 Infra note 69, 76, and 83.
68 There are very few positive examples of what is patent eligible under the Alice
framework, making it difficult for a patent practitioner to make a convincing comparison when
responding to an Office Action from the USPTO, or when litigating the validity of a claim.
69 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
70 Id. at 1248.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1255.
73 Id.
66
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claims in DDR did not recite a mathematical algorithm or “a
fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice.”74
Instead, the claims in DDR addressed a business challenge particular
to the internet.75 Unlike the claims at issue in Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC,76 the claims in DDR specified how interactions with the
internet are manipulated to produce a desired result.77
Next, the court considered the elements of a claim, individually
and as an ordered combination to determine whether the additional
elements transformed the nature of the claim into the patent-eligible
application of an abstract idea.78 In DDR, the ordered combination of
the elements was not merely the routine or conventional use of the
internet.79 It is important to note that the claims at issue in DDR
“recite[d] a specific way to automate the creation of a composite
webpage” by a third-party provider to incorporate selected elements
from a plurality of sources.80 The claims here did not seek to
monopolize an abstract idea.81 Ultimately, the court upheld the patenteligibility of the claims at issue because they were “necessarily rooted
in computer technology” that “overc[ame] a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks.”82
In Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,83 the Federal Circuit found
that claims which were directed to a “self-referential database” were
patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.84 The court held that the claims

74 Id. at 1257. Although, the Federal Circuit cautioned that “not all claims purporting to
address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. at 1258.
75 Id. at 1255.
76 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The claims at issue in Ultramercial were directed to a
“[m]ethod and system for payment of intellectual property royalties by interposed sponsor on
behalf of consumer over a telecommunications network.” Id.
77 DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258 (holding the claims at issue in DDR “do not broadly and
generically claim ‘use of the internet’ to perform an abstract business practice (with
insignificant added activity)”). In Ultramercial, the claims at issue were not directed to patenteligible subject matter. Instead, the claims were directed to “the abstract idea of showing an
advertisement before delivering free content.” Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715.
78 DDR, 773 F.3d at 1255.
79 Id. at 1259.
80 Id.
81
Id. (explaining that claims must “include ‘additional feature’ that ensure the claims are
‘more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]’” (quoting Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014))).
82 Id. at 1275.
83 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
84 Id.
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at issue were not directed towards an abstract idea but were directed to
the non-abstract idea of improving the way computers work.85
First, the court discussed how the “directed to” inquiry, in the
first step of the Alice framework, does not simply ask whether the
claims merely “involve a patent-ineligible concept” but examines
whether as a whole, they are directed to an excluded subject matter.86
The court reasoned that Alice is not to be read so broadly that “all
improvements in computer-related technology are inherently abstract”
and all such improvements must be considered at the second step of
the Alice framework.87
The court contrasted the patent in Enfish with other patents that
just “recited generalized steps to be performed on a computer using
conventional computer activity.”88 The court explained that the patent
in Enfish was directed to “a specific type of data structure designed to
improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory.”89
The claims were unambiguously directed to “an improvement to
computer functionality itself.”90
The Federal Circuit in Enfish, emphasized that “the first step in
the Alice inquiry . . . asks whether the focus of the claims is on the
specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead,
on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool.”91 The Federal Circuit then explained
that “the claims are directed to a specific implementation of a solution
to a problem in the software arts,” and therefore are not directed to an
abstract idea.92
In summary, the Federal Circuit clarified that when claims are
found to not be directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one, but
“specific improvements to underlying computer-related technology,”
there would be no need to evaluate the claims under Alice step two to
determine whether the claim adds significantly more than an abstract
idea.93

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id. at 1335-36.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
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In another case decided after Alice, BASCOM Global Internet
Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,94 the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s judgment of patent ineligibility.95 The patents at issue
claimed a system for filtering content retrieved from an internet
computer network.96
The Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly applied
the first step in the Alice framework.97 The claims were directed to the
abstract idea of filtering content on the Internet.98 Filtering content on
the Internet is a “longstanding, well-known method of organizing
human behavior,” and is therefore an abstract idea.99
The district court in BASCOM failed to correctly perform step
two of the Alice framework.100 The court examined the claimed
elements individually and as an ordered combination.101 The Federal
Circuit concurred with the district court’s analysis that the individual
elements: a generic computer, a network, and an internet connection
individually did “not amount to significantly more.”102 Although the
Federal Circuit explained that when claimed elements are combined,
“an inventive concept may be found in the non-conventional and nongeneric arrangement” of the additional elements.103 In BASCOM, this
non-conventional and non-generic arrangement was the installation of
the filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end users, with
customizable filtering features specific to each end user.104
Therefore, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed system
for filtering content retrieved from an internet computer network was
not abstract, and that under the second step of the Alice framework
there was an inventive concept.105

94

827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1343.
96 Id. at 1345.
97 Id. at 1348.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1350.
101 Id. at 1348-50.
102
Id. at 1343.
103 Id. at 1349-50 (disagreeing “with the district court’s analysis of the ordered combination
of limitations”). The Federal Circuit also held that “[t]he inventive concept inquiry requires
more than recognizing that each claim element by itself, was known in the art.” Id. at 1350.
104 Id. at 1350-51.
105 Id. at 1352.
95
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The Federal Circuit in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc.106 examined patents which concerned a system designed to solve
an accounting and billing problem faced by network service
providers.107 Four separate patents were examined by the court: ‘065,
‘510, ‘984, and ‘797.108
In the ‘065 patent the court held the claim patent-ineligible
because it failed to recite any structure or process limiting the claim to
a particular means of combining accounting data from different
sources.109 The court held that the claim was nothing more than the
abstract idea of “gathering and combining data.”110
In the ‘510 patent, the court found that like the claims at issue
in Enfish and McRO,111 the claims are “directed to” a particular process
that improves upon the manner in which systems collect and process
network usage information, and the claimed process is limited in a
specific way.112 As such, the claims are patent-eligible under step one
of the Alice test, and there is no need to consider step two.113
For the ‘984 patent the court held that the claims directed to
“reporting on the collection of network usage information from a
plurality of network devices” are patent eligible.114 The court noted
“that the ‘process or machinery’ by which a result is accomplished
need not be tangible to be patent eligible.”115 The court discussed how
a claim is not patent-ineligible just because the claim is software.116
In the ‘797 patent the court held these claims patent-ineligible
for lack of an inventive concept under the second step in the Alice
framework.117 The court held that the ‘797 patent was nothing more
than the abstract idea of “gathering and combining data” and that the
claim added only “conventional computer functions in a conventional

106
107
108
109
110
111

841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text; see infra notes 141-54 and accompanying

text.
112
113
114
115
116
117

Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1304.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
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manner” and therefore “amount[ed] to electronic recordkeeping”
which is “one of the most basic functions of a computer.”118
The Federal Circuit in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capitol
One Bank (USA),119 examined two patents for patentability under
section 101 (hereinafter the ‘137 and ‘382 patents).120 For the ‘137
patent, the court held claims directed to budgeting using a computer to
give notification when a pre-set spending limit is reached was an
abstract idea.121 With respect to the ‘382 patent, the court held that
claims directed to “customizing web page content as a function of
navigation history and information known about the user” were also
abstract ideas.122
First, the Federal Circuit analyzed the ‘137 patent, which had
claims directed to budgeting using a computer to give notification
when a pre-set spending limit is exceeded.123 Under the first step of
the Alice framework, the court noted that the claims recited budgeting
using a “communication medium.”124 Merely limiting the claims by
using a “communication medium” was not sufficient to render the
claims not abstract.125
Next, the court moved to step two of the Alice framework to
analyze the claims in search of an inventive concept.126 The court held
that the claims did not contain an inventive concept because all the
recited elements were generic computer elements.127 The budgeting
calculations in the claim could easily be done with a pen and paper and
were therefore unpatentable.128
The Federal Circuit in Intellectual Ventures also analyzed the
‘382 patent, which had claims directed to “customizing a web page as
a function of navigation history and information known about the

118

Id. at 1316.
792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1367.
122 Id. at 1369.
123 Id.
124 Id. (indicating that the communication medium “broadly include[d] the Internet and
telephone networks.”).
125
Id. at 1368.
126 Id.
127 Id. (“Instructing one to ‘apply’ an abstract idea and reciting no more than generic
computer elements performing generic computer tasks does not make an abstract idea patenteligible.”).
128 Id.
119
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user.”129 Under the first step of the Alice framework, the court
analyzed the claim to determine whether the claims at issue cover a
“fundamental . . . practice long prevalent in our system.”130 The claim
was directed to “customizing information based on (1) information
known about the user and (2) navigation data.”131 First, the court
determined that customizing information based on information known
about the user is a “fundamental . . . practice long prevalent in our
system.”132 The court compared this to newspaper inserts being
customized based on the subscriber’s location.133 Next, the court
analyzed the second aspect, customization of information based on
navigation data by comparing it to a website and updating its logo
based on the time of day.134 This was also found to be abstract because
it is an “overly broad concept long-practiced in our society.”135
The Federal Circuit in Intellectual Ventures held there to be no
inventive step under the second step in the Alice framework.136 Merely
using a generic computer to increase the speed of the process is overly
broad, and therefore is an abstract idea.137
The Federal Circuit distinguished the claims here from those in
DDR, in which the patent at issue solved a problem “unique to the
Internet” without monopolizing other ways of solving that problem.138
Unlike the claims in DDR, the claims at issue in Intellectual Ventures
did not address a problem “unique to the Internet.”139 Instead, the court
held the claims at issue claimed an abstract idea that did not have an
inventive concept.140
In McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.,141 the
Federal Circuit held patent-eligible method claims for automatic lip
synchronization and facial expression animation using computer
implemented rules.142 Utilizing the first step of the Alice framework,
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 1369.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1370.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1312.
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the court found these claims were not directed towards an abstract
idea.143
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s holding
that the claims were “drawn to the [abstract] idea of automated rulesbased use of morph targets and delta sets for lip-synchronized threedimensional animation.”144 The Federal Circuit cautioned the district
court against oversimplifying the claims by looking at them
generally.145
The court in McRO, when doing its analysis, focused on the
nature of “directed to.”146 In step one of the Mayo test, the court’s
focus was to unpack the “directed to” inquiry.147 For a claim to be
“directed to” an abstract idea, first, the court determines whether the
claim was directed to a judicial exception.148 Next, the court turns to
framing the abstract idea expression, as intended to exclude the claims
themselves, rather than on the methods or processes that produce the
results.149
The court explained that allowing computers to produce
“accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expression in
animated characters” that could previously only be done by human
animators was an “improvement in computer related technology.”150
The claimed methods improved computer animation through the use
of specific rules to generate output morph weight sets and transition
parameters between phenomes.151 The specification explained that the
human artists do not use the claimed rules and rely instead on
subjective determinations to set the morph weights and manipulate the
animated face to match pronounced phenomes.152

143

Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1313.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1312.
147 Id. at 1314.
148 Id. at 1312.
149 Id. (“The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by
what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’” (citation omitted)).
150 Id. at 1307.
151 Id. at 1312. Phenomes are related to sounds made when speaking. See Phenome,
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/phoneme (last visited Apr. 8, 2019)
(“Phoneme, in linguistics, smallest unit of speech distinguishing one word (or word element)
from another, as the element p in “tap,” which separates that word from “tab,” “tag,” and
“tan.”). Morph weights sets are related to facial expressions as an animated character speaks.
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312.
152 McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313.
144
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The Federal Circuit explained it was the incorporation of the
claimed rules in computer animation that “improved [the] existing
technological process,” making the claims patent-eligible.153 The
claims at issue described a specific way to solve a problem as opposed
to merely claiming the idea of a solution and therefore were not
directed to an abstract idea.154
The Federal Circuit in In re TLI Communications LLC Patent
Litigation,155 found invalid a patent directed to the generalized steps of
classifying and then storing digital images in an organized manner
which did not add an inventive concept.156
First, the court analyzed the claims at issue under step one of
the Alice framework by determining whether the claims extend to
cover a “fundamental . . . practice long prevalent in our system.”157
The court contrasted the claims to those at issue in Enfish.158 In Enfish,
the claims at issue were directed to “the functioning of a computer.”159
In contrast, the claims at issue in TLI were directed to the use of
generic technology in a well-known environment without any claim to
an inventive concept in the combination of the two.160 The claims’
generalized steps of recording, communicating, and administering a
digital image “in an organized manner” were an abstract idea.161
Next, examining the claims at issue under the second step in
the Alice analysis, the Federal Circuit in TLI found that the elements
individually, and in an ordered combination, failed to transform the

153

Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1315-16. To find an “exception” during examination, the Examiners at the USPTO
must consider case law such as McRO. However, many examiners are not attorneys and thus
lack training in analysis of case law. See Brian Pangrle, Putting Words in the Mouth of McRO:
The PTO Memorandum of November 2, 2016, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/09/putting-words-mouth-mcro-pto-memorandumnovember-2-2016/id=81690/. The USPTO has provided guidance memorandum including
cases such as McRO. However, some of these guidances are incorrect. For example, the
USPTO Memorandum of November 2, 2016 as to Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions
incorrectly attributes the terms “computer related technology” to McRO. This adds a layer of
confusion when responding to USPTO rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, some
more recent cases, cited later in this article, may provide additional clarity.
155 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
156
Id.
157 Id. at 611.
158 Id. at 612.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 613.
154
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abstract idea into a patent-eligible one.162 Merely applying the steps
on a generic server or on a generic telephone did nothing to make the
generic steps any less abstract because they were “well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.”163
The Federal Circuit in TLI concluded that patent eligibility is
not conferred by the performance of mere generic steps that state an
abstract idea and then do no more than “apply it on a computer.”164
The court held that the claims in TLI do no more than carry the abstract
idea out on a generic telephone or server and thus do not confer patent
eligibility.165
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc.,166 the
patents at issue claimed a method for increasing the chance that a
stockbroker will have orders filled at a desired price on an electronic
exchange by reducing the time required for a trader to place a trade.167
The Federal Circuit found the claims patent-eligible and were not an
abstract idea.168
The Federal Circuit examined the district court’s application of
the first step in the Alice framework.169 The Federal Circuit noted that
the district court found the patents at issue were not merely displaying
information on a graphical user interface, but instead were directed to
“improvements in existing graphical user interface devices that have
no ‘pre-electronic trading analog’ and recite[d] more than ‘setting,
displaying, and selecting’ data or information that is visible on a
[graphical user interface] device.”170 Therefore, the claims at issue met
the subject matter eligibility standard under the first step in the Alice
framework.171
The court continued its analysis of the claims under the second
step in the Alice framework and found that there was an “inventive
concept” recited in the claims.172 The court found that the static price
index was the “inventive concept” because it “allow[ed] traders to
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id.
675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
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more efficiently and accurately place trades using this electronic
trading system.”173 Therefore, the claims at issue met the criteria for
the second step in the Alice framework.174
The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding in Enfish that a claim
is not abstract when the software is not simply using a computer to
merely perform “a known or obvious process, but instead” improves
the way computer systems work as a whole.175 The Federal Circuit
explained that for section 101 purposes, no consideration should be
given to the substantive criteria of patentability.176
More recently, the Federal Circuit in Berkheimer v. HP Inc.177
issued a precedential decision holding that the question of whether
certain claim limitations represent “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity” raise a disputed factual issue.178 In Berkheimer,
the Federal Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois holding that claims 1-7 and 9 of U.S.
Patent No. 7,447,713 (‘713 patent) were invalid as ineligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101.179 This disputed factual issue precluded summary
judgment that all of the claims at issue were not patent eligible.180 The
impact of Berkheimer on patent prosecution has yet to be seen, but
some believe that it may provide some additional clarity during
prosecution by preventing patent examiners from providing
unsupported factual findings during a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §
101.181
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id. at 1008.
881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1368.
The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is
well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the
relevant field is a question of fact. Any fact, such as this one, that is
pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

Id.
179

Id.
Id.
181 Jeremy Doerre & David Boundy, Berkheimer, the Administrative Procedure Act, and
PTO Motions to Vacate PTAB § 101 Decisions, IP WATCHDOG (July 16, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/16/berkheimer-administrative-procedure-act-ptomotions-vacate-ptab-§-101-decisions/id=99194/ (“In particular, as outlined below, the PTO
has recently moved to vacate PTAB decisions in several Federal Circuit appeals that had
challenged eligibility conclusions as being improperly based on unsupported factual findings.
180
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CONCLUSION: THE POST-ALICE JURISPRUDENCE PENDULUM
AND ITS EFFECTS

The short-term effect of the Supreme Court’s unanimous
decision in Alice has been the massive rejection by the district courts
and the USPTO of software patent claims.182 In the USPTO alone,
Alice has caused the monthly rate of appeals and abandons to triple,
while causing monthly allowances to drop to one-eighth of their preAlice rates.183 Based on current trends, the lack of a clear definition of
an abstract idea by either the Supreme Court or the legislature will only
make this issue worse, thus thwarting the very purpose of the Patent
Act, which is to promote innovation.184
However, the pendulum has begun to swing from the simple
idea of normal human activity being implemented on a computer
providing no improvement at all as in Ultramercial, to the
improvement to the functioning of a computer as illustrated by Enfish
and McRO. This change in interpretation by the Federal Circuit, and
the impact of Berkheimer during examination, will allow practitioners
some direction and clarity in drafting claims and provide protection for
inventors.

These cases are only the tip of the iceberg, and it is tough to estimate how many pending PTAB
appeals will require reversal of examiner rejections for this same reason. When a party has to
backtrack on this many cases, it is usually because multiple failsafes failed.”)
182 Supra note 2.
183 Mark Nowotarski, Surviving Alice In the Finance Arts, BILSKI BLOG (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/alicestorm/.
184 Supra note 2.
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